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Summary
In the last few years, several innovations have appeared in mortgage
finance which are designed to improve the flow of funds into mortgage lending.
One of these innovations is the FNMA Free System Auction. This paper analyzes
this auction by developing a bidding model for use by participating mortgage
banking firms. Next, historical frequencies are used to establish the proba-
bility of acceptance for any particular bid, given the predicted low accepted
bid. It is then shown how the mortgage banking firm can utilize the model,
given its individual needs.
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AN ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO THE
FNMA FREE MARKET SYSTEM AUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, several innovations have appeared in mortgage
finance which are designed to improve the flow of funds into mortgage lending.
Among this group, The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) remains
the intermediary which handles the largest share of most mortgage lenders'
placements. FNMA is a private corporation, chartered by Congress and owned
by stockholders, that provides a national secondary market facility for
2
government-backed (FHA/VA) and conventional mortgages. Through its secondary
market operations, FNMA furnishes a source of liquidity for mortgage lenders,
the major portion of this support being provided through the Free Market System
(FMS) auctions. Through its issuance of forward purchase commitments, the
FNMA assures lenders of a permanent investor (at a set yield) for specified
periods of time, regardless of changing money market and housing conditions.
For a discussion of all the placement options available to mortgage
lenders, see Sears, Steve, "Mortgage Placement Alternatives" North Carolina
Investment Institute Working Papers
,
UNC (1979).
Sources include: Federal National Mortgage Association, Free Market
System Auction
, 1977; Federal National Mortgage Association, FHA/VA Home
Mortgage Programs and How They Work
, 1976; Federal National Mortgage Association,
Conventional Program for Home Mortgages
,
1976.
Through the FMS auctions, FNMA issues optional forward commitments
(four months) for the purchase of single-family mortgage loans from originating
lenders. Basically, lenders offer to sell mortgages to FNMA at specified
yields. FNMA then evaluates these offers, determines the amount of mortgages
it will purchase (i.e., the yields it will accept) and then issues forward
commitments to the successful bidders.
Such auctions are conducted on alternate Mondays with participation
limited to FNMA-approved lenders(sellers) . Bids must be telephoned between
the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Washington, D.C. time, on the day of
the auctions. Competitive bids submitted by the seller must include, in the
yield, 3/S of 1% servicing fee which will be received by the seller for
servicing the mortgage, should the bid be accepted by FNMA. (Cont. page 2)
To evaluate the potential economic significance of the FMS auctions,
one must first determine how the placement opportunities provided by the
auctions may be used by mortgage lenders. In this endeavor, the clearest
case of the entrepreneur among the various mortgage lenders is the non-
depository financial intermediary, the mortgage banking firm (MBF). Sir.ce
its entire operation is oriented to mortgage finance, the MBF provides an
excellent example of a mortgage lender attempting to efficiently utilize
the FMS auctions. This paper analyzes the operations of this financial
intermediary and develops a bid model for use in the FMS auctions.
The Mortgage Banking Firm
The MBF is a non-depository intermediary whose principal activits is
the originating and servicing of loans secured either by commercial or
residential real estate. The firm operates by taking loan applications
(from either developers or individual borrowers), committing funds to
these borrowers, closing the loans with funds normally borrowed through
bank lines of credit and finally selling a package of loans to permanent
u.
investors. The proceeds from sale, in excess of credit advances,
3Simultaneous, but separate, auctions are conducted for conventional and
FHA/VA mortgages. A single seller may submit up to five competitive bids in
each of the two auctions, subject to certain requirements:
1. The maximum dollar amount for any single bid is $3 million for
both auctions. Thus the total amount of the bids submitted carrot
exceed $15 million (per auction).
2. The minimum dollar amount for any one bid is $10,000, and onl\
one bid can be for less than $500,000.
Each competitive bid submitted by a seller must be identified b\ a -id
number (i.e., 1,. . .,5). These bid numbers determine the amount of bid ~ee
charged (which ranges from 1/100 of 1% for bid number one to 1/50 of 1% f:r
bids two through five). In addition, for accepted bids, a non-refundable
commitment fee of 1/2 of 1% is charged. (Cont. page 3)
along with origination fee, servicing fee, float and warehousing arbitrage,
represent income.
In handling loan originations and sales, the MBF can follow one of three
general patterns:
1. Origination without commitment—the mortgage loan is originated
and held in the MBF's investment portfolio until a final lender can be
located. Such a procedure creates two problems for the firm:
a. A final lender may not be found, in time, to provide funds for
repayment of the commercial bank warehousing loan.
b. Upward shifts in market interest rates between the MBF's com-
mitment to a borrower and the final sale of the loan package
may produce a marketing loss upon subsequent sale (i.e., require
a discount on final sale).
2. Mandatory commitment—the mortgage loan is originated after all
arrangements are settled with a permanent lender or other secondary market
source. In this case, the MBF must deliver the loan. This particular
origination alternative provides the firm with the necessary protection
against the above problems. It insures the firm that funds will be available
when needed and it guarantees a floor (and ceiling) on the price to be
Lenders are also permitted to bid non-competitively in the auctions.
In doing so, the lender must again meet certain requirements:
a. Only one non-competitive bid may be submitted per auction and
the seller cannot bid both competitively and non-competitively
in the same auction.
b. The minimum and maximum dollar amounts for the non-competitive
bid are $10,000 and $250,000, respectively.
c. The seller is guaranteed that its bid will be accepted, but it
agrees to accept the weighted average yield of all bids accepted
by FMMA for that auction (which may be significantly greater than
the low accepted bid).
Mckinnon, H. Alexander, Miles, Mike, and McLeod, Robert W. "Evaluation
Model Can Improve Performance in FMMA Auction." The Mortgage Banker (March,
1975), p. 54.
received for the mortgage loan. On the other hand, such a commitment does
not protect the firm from downward shifts in interest rates. Such shifts
could result in the firm originating loans at a rate less than the yield
promised to the final lender and consequently result in a marketing loss on
disposition.
3. Optional commitment—the mortgage loan is still originated after
all arrangements are settled with the permanent investor. However, in this
instance, final delivery is optional, pending arrangement of a more favorable
placement alternative. This method operates in a manner similar to the man-
datory commitment, but with the firm now also insulated against downward
interest rate shifts during the warehousing period (so long as a new permanent
lender can be located).
In assessing the relative merits of these alternatives, one should. note
that the basic philosophy of the MBF is' to attempt to maximize production
(or loan origination) because this, in turn, leads to the greatest servicing
revenue (which is the largest profit item). Consequently, MBF's seek to
obtain prior coverage equal to most of their expectations of mortgage loan demand
and maximize production while avoiding the two risks noted above. As a result,
these two risks can be said to place constraints on the firm's operations.
Historically, MBF's have handled these constraints through the secondary
market private commitment process. However, the extent to which this process
can be utilized has greatly diminished via the changing economic conditions
of the late 1960's and early 1970' s. (i.e., life insurance companies, as well
as other private lenders, have been able to locate more attractive investment
This is not to say, however, that MBF's will only originate when
covered. At times, a firm will originate in anticipation of finding
coverage at a later date. However, the typical firm will incorporate a risk
constraint in its decision-making process to limit the amount of its uncovered
portfolio.
opportunities.) The MBF has thus been forced to look elsewhere for alter-
native risk-shifting mechanisms.
One such alternative is the FNMA FMS auction. The auction provides the
mortgage banker with the necessary time-risk shifting mechanism that was pre-
viously available in the strictly private sector. However, the two commitment
alternatives differ in at least one important aspect. Under the private commit-
ment, the MBF was assured of purchase by the permanent lender via commitments
negotiated under long standing relationships with specific permanent lenders.
In FNMA auctions, the firm must bid for the right to sell its package of loans.
Hence, there is less assurance of the availability of funds (at a set price)
to meet liquidity needs. Furthermore, if the firm's bid is accpeted at a higher
yield than competing mortgage lenders, the MBF will be at a competitive dis-
advantage in loan origiantion.
Therefore, it behooves the firm to have a strategy model for participation
in the FMS auctions. A model is needed to estimate the lowest yield that will
be accepted by FNMA and then establish a probability of acceptance around the
expected low bid. The MBF can then bid "optimally," given its existing
portfolio, expected mortgage loan demand, and its willingness to assume the
aforementioned risks.
The Proposed Model
The proposed model is designed to achieve three goals:
1) The model provides a better set of determinants than the naive
strategy of employing last period's low accepted bid as the firm's best guess
for the low bid to be accepted in the upcoming auction. This strategy (which
is currently employed by many MBF's) may be effective in a fairly stable
market, but becomes less satisfactory in more volatile markets.
2) The model is capable of application in the real world. An MBF can
utilize the model as a tool in its decision-making process.
McKinnon, p. 57.
3) The model is based on theoretical precepts. That is, the deter-
minants of the predicted low accepted bid in the upcoming FMS auctions are
logical from an economic theory persepctive.
Theoretical Determinants
Since the variable to be determined (the low accepted bid in the up-
coming auction) is expressed in interest rate form, related economic theory
can be used to. develop a set of suitable determinants. Certainly, the
interest rate (or price) of an asset should be a function of the demand
for and the supply of the asset in question. Thus, two logical determinants
of the upcoming low accepted auction yield should be the demand for and
the supply of mortgage funds.
Since markets are typically interrelated, the interest rate on mortgages
should be a function of not only its own supply and demand, but also a
function of demand-supply conditions in competing markets. Therefore, a
third determinant should capture this substitution effect between the secondary
mortgage market and competing financial markets.
A fourth determinant, one that has become increasingly important in
recent years, is inflation. Since mortgage loans are typically denominated
in nominal terms, a lender is interested in changes in the purchasing power
of the returned principal. Thus, should FNMA anticipate price increases,
it could be expected to incorporate an inflation premium into the low bid
which it is willing to accept.
The authors note the "chicken-egg" problem in the above statement
.
The direction of causality between yield and supply/demand is probably dual.
Thus, a more sophisticated model would be one in which not only the \ield,
but also supply and demand were determined endogenously.
A final determinant is not one which is clearly grounded in economic
theory, but one which involves the influence of FNMA (as a quasi-governmental
body) in the mortgage market. Since FNMA was created specifically to aid
this capital market sector during "troubled time," it may not act in exactly
the same manner as a private enterprise. Some subsidizing from period to
period may be anticipated to smooth rate changes, and such behavior is im-
portant to the HBF in anticipating the low accepted bid.
Variable Proxies
Concerning suitable proxies for the demand and supply variables, newly
placed construction and the difference between IL and M, (as a measure of
time deposits at banks and thrift institutions) were chosen. These seemed
to be logical choices due to their aggregate nature and the fact that the
auctions are conducted on a national basis.
The substitution variable is represented by the most recent yield on
three to five year Government bonds, taken on a bi-weekly basis. (Any large
volume medium term maturity would be acceptable given the 8 to 12 year expected
life of mortgage loans.) Changes in this yield are also represented in the
model to temper the effect that this yield has an explanatory variable.
(A fuller explanation follows in footnote 16.)
Concerning the measurement of inflation, proxy choices included the
annualized rate of change in the consumer, housing, and wholesale price
indexes. (Quite clearly, there is a potential double counting problem
o
Data concerning the respective price indexes is provided on a monthly
basis by the bureau of Labor Statistics. The monthly levels are coverted
into annualized rates of changes by:
ARCO
t
between the substitution and inflation variables which will be dealt with
subsequently.
)
Finally, the government involvement variable chosen was the spread
between the current market level of mortgage rates (as represented by the
FHLBB new homes series) and the previous auction's weighted average yield
of accepted bids). To some extent, movement in this spread captures the
"smoothing '* intent of FNMA in the low bid acceptance decision.
Variable Measurement Problems
Several problems exist in the proper measurement of the determinants
chosen. With practical application as a goal, it is critical that values of
the chosen determinants be known prior to the upcoming. auction.
This presents problems with several of the variables, particularly
demand, supply, and inflation. The crux of the matter is that the latest
levels of several of the variables are only known witn a considerable lag.
Hence, one must either assume that the latest information available is the
most relevant; or, generate expectations concerning current (unknown) levels.
In this study, both the latest known level as well as the expected (current)
level are examined with expectations generated via Box-3enkins techniques.
9
Data sources for variables used in the model include:
The Federal Reserve Bulletin, The Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal,
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Federal National Mortgage Association.
The latest levels of variables in these three categories are known to
the decision-maker only after a lag of six to eight weeks. An additional
problem exists because some of the variable values (particularly demand and
supply) are subject to continual revision. The authors, in keeping with
their objective of using only known information at the time of auction,
avoided utilizing revised or updated information. For , even if today's in-
formation is incorrect, it is the information with which the !'3F must work
that is appropriate in this study.
That is, one could presume that the best estimate the current (unknown)
level is the most recent known level (a random walk). Or, one can extrapolate
to produce an estimate of the current level.
In addition to the information lag problem, some of the variables are
available only in monthly form, creating an additional problem since FtlMA
auctions are conducted on a bi-weekly basis. For these variables, the authors
analyze (again) two different series. One series uses only the monthly
figures and results in values being used twice or three times (for those months
in which three auctions were held). A second series is created in which
12interpolated values are used.
Methodology and Organization of the Study
This study was conducted over the period extending from Oanuary 197^ -
December 1978. The period is marked by a major recession, along with fluctuating
mortgage yields which reached then record peaks in late 1978 - early 1979.
The regression is organized in the following manner. First, the period
extending from January 191k - June 1976 (65 auctions) was used for parameter
estimation. For each of the two auctions, a regression equation was estimated
in the hypothesized format. Results from the theoretical model were compared
to a naive model which utilizes only the previous auction's low accepted bid.
(Other work has shown this "naive model" to be the most common estimation
14-
technique used by practicing mortgage bankers.)
12
Although arbitrary, the authors assumed the monthly level to be taken
at the midpoint of the month. Interpolated values were then created to fall
on the Fridays preceding the auctions. Again, it was necessary that interpolated
values be created from known information at the time of the auction.
The authors note certain regulatory changes which were partially imple-
mented over the sample period. (For a background discussion, see the Hunt
Commission and FINE studies).
McKinnon Pg. 57.
10
Secondly, the parameter estimates from the test period were used with
observations on the exogenous variables in the second period (3ul> 1976 -
December 1978) to produce forecasted values for the low accepted bids,
(i.e., the estimates from the first period were tested over the latter
period.
)
The authors hypothesized that the expanded model would both out-perform
the naive verison over both the test and forecast periods and confirm the
set of theoretically appealing determinants via good performance o\er the
latter period.
Finally, a probability parameter is employed in order to provide the
MBF with the probability that any particular bid will be accepted given the
low bid forecast.
Estimation Period-Multiple Regression Model
Lag relationships were used to capture the effects of administrative
action (i.e., loan committee decisions on lending rates) and price expectations
(inflation). The expected problems of multicollinearity and autocorrelation
were examined, with the inflation variable falling out of the equation.
Once the regression equation was specified, an examination of the
correlation matrix revealed no major multicollinearity problems. The Durbin-
Watson statistic did reveal the presence of first-order autocorrelation. An
A highly colinear relationship exists between the rate on competing in-
struments (3 to 5 year governments) and the inflation variable as *ould be ex-
pected on a theoretical basis. According to the Fisher effect, the obsersed
nominal rate, i, has two components:
r = the real rate
p = inflation component, or the percentage change in prices
Hence, since all money market and capital market rates are expressed in nominal
terms, the substitution variable includes an inflation compenent. Thus, the
authors would argue that a single variable can be used to represent demand/
supply conditions in other markets, as well as inflation.
11
examination of the residuals revealed no significant autocorrelation past
first-order. Thus, the autocorrelation was corrected via Cochrane-Orcutt
procedures to put the estimators in their final form.
Disscussion of Estimation Period Results
The results for the estimation period are shown in Table I. The model rep-
resentations are denoted as:
1 = FHA/VA auction, multiple regression
2 = conventional auction, multiple regression
IN = FHA/VA auction, naive model
2N = conventional auction, naive model
and:
X, = current yield on three-five year U.S. Government bonds.
X
?
= changes in X. over most recent two-week period
X = mortgage supply, as measured by M, - M, , lagged two months
for the FHA/VA and lagged three months for the conventional.
The lag is intended to proxy the period required for lending
institutions to translate new information into rates on loan
. . ., 17
originations.
16
Mortgage loan origination is a rather extended process typically
requiring 60 to 90 days. Originators usually have some flexibility in adjusting
rates during the process but this is usually the function of a loan committee
which meets only weekly or bi-weekly. Since the loan origination rate is
a major factor in determining secondary market rates, rates in this market
adjust to change more slowly than do regularly traded bonds. Hence the need
to temper the effect of competing yields with recent changes in those yields.
It takes longer for lending institutions to translate market infor-
mation into rates on newly origianted conventional loans, relative to FHA/VA
loans, because of the inefficiency of the conventional market vis a vis the
FHA/VA market. This is not surprising, since in the FHA/VA one finds a highly
standardized, very homogenous product. In addition, with the volume of activity
in the GtittA security market, additional information is provided which signals
any forthcoming changes in market rates. (Cont. page 11)
12
—
(B
ft
m
• •
*
* *
* * *
II II II
</> w w
h- t— H-
iO a lQ3 Z3 3
H» h" t—
-l» -t> -1)
H« t— H-
O o o
Cu CD CD
3 a 3
ft rt ft
Cu 0> CU
rt rt Ct
• • •O O o
VI H- o
rv
^J CD ^J CD
o
o
m
rv i— oZZNH a
Fi
Jp V0 ON ~J
-^1 1— rv Jp
rv> i— 0\ »—O VI 0\ ON lo
V> VO ON JP
o o o o
*-!_- *«w'
* *
•^G- n^• VI •
• • VjJ Jp • Jp
VjJ Jp JP Jp ON O
vj 00 4? Jp O ^iU1WO ON ON VI 1 xOV0 VO mo vj l»-
VjJ ~J h- ON VO Jp
N> O uo
^~ "*
<?T , Or,
• IV vo • iv I—O • r\J o • •
ON JP O ^J ON t—
[V VjJ VjJ -J VI V>
VI -p- on rj cd vi 1 x
VjJ vo Jp vi -p rv ||NJ
ui ro O V VI
^S US°
* *
* *
r"\T. PT.
1 h- • • rv •
• • O Jp • OW vj O >JHO
CD I\> [V O JP VI XPUIsl H- VO VI VI
VI 'vj VO VO vo t—
Jp CD Jp vj vl VO
VI o US
*
»-»-
* *
* *
• • o
D^.
IV • ON vIO CD IV oO H- O O vo OO vo O ON o o
1
^H vj H VO VjJ IV l-p-
VO
-P VI ON VO t—
S3 US
* *
* *
* *
f?r
,
• VI • VjJ • VI
-p • -p JP ON h-
V> VjJ >-• Jp VjJ CD
1
^
UJ VI VI VO 1— V |vi
ON 1— Vl VO t- O
VO O I— CD VjJ V.0
.VI VI t— U~
cr
cd .*—
*
rt ft
Cu
<
O a>
o i—1
(B c
-*> CD
-h (/>
H«
O H«
H- 3
CD
3 T3
ft 01
(A •-J
CD
H- 3
3 rt
3-
cr CD
^ W
a> CD
o 01
7C N*^
CD
rt
C/>
n • • «o V0 vo VO V0
m H H vl0>
l-fc-n vo o rv ^j
-n iv vi rvj rv»
33
rn
en
c
en
o
h- I-1 O O
VJJ Jp ^J CD
ON V) V0 ONN IV) PH
—
m
m
m
en
en
i—
i
o
z
o
a
m
en
—i
>
—
<
l-H
en
—i —i
r-i >O CD
> r-
r- m
en
en
i\> h-
^j on rvj cd
IV VI H-' ON X
vo O O O rv
• • 77
ON ON VO O 1
K— O VI VjJ h-
* * * *
m
w
rt
H>
3
OJ
rt
H-
O
3
no
CD
o
Q.
13
X. = mortgage demand, as measured by new construction put in place,
lagged two months for both auctions. Here the lag represents
the timing of permanent -loan- funding relative to actual
construction, (i.e., permanent -loan- funding follows actual
construction by a period dependent on the particular type of
construction. In a single family lending, it follows by an
average of 1/2 of the total construction period, usually 90
to 120 days.)
X
s
= spread between the latest known level of mortgage interest
rates (as measured by the FHLBB new-homes series) and the pre-
15
vious auction's weighted average yield on accepted bids.
While the formulations do not at first appear ideal due to the flow-stock com-
19binations and the predictions of levels vs. changes, subsequent tests ' validate
these constructs whose results are in the form most recognizable by the MBF.
Even though the governmentally related loan auctions have done much to
enhance the standardization of the conventional loan package, the conventional
loan, itself, is highly heterogenous. Underwriting conditions are still a
function of the individual lending institution. For this reason, it takes
lending institutions longer to assimilate new information and its possible :
impacts on future loan rates.
18
These proxies were chosen to represent the variables in the regression
model of this ability to satisy four conditions:
(a) The figure must be avail ble at the time of the auction (i.e., revised
figures were not used since the practicing IIBF would not have had the
revised figures at the time it was making the bid decision.
(b) The proxy should be highly correlated with the dependent variable.
(c) The proxy should not be highly correlated with the remaining
explanatory variables so as to minimize the problem of multi-
collinearity
.
(d) The proxy should be a logical choice, given the categories of
variables to be used in the model. (Cont. on page 13).
14
TABLE II**
MODEL
i
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
BETWEEN ACTUAL LOW
MEAN ABSOLUTE BID AND FORECASTED
SEE ERROR LOW BID
991 fl*-
.083720 .066980 ' yyx
°
2
9958*
.069051 .054360 ,:wo
IN .096981 .071248
2N .082413 .061614
Where:
* = Significant at the .001 level
** = for correct interpretation of the above results, the
reader should note that the endogenous variables were
measured in percentage (i.e., 9.82) form, not decimal
(i.e., .0982) form. In addition, the first three
auctions of 1979 were included to see if the models
were capable of "picking up" the then record 11%
yields.
15
As can be seen from Table I, the multiple regression provides a significant
improvenment over the naive model in terms of adjusted R , as well as SEE
20(Standard Error of the Estimate).
All coefficients are significant and possess the hypothesized signs.
Variable Hypothesized Sign
Competing yields and inflation (X, ) +
Changes in X., (X_) - (tempering influence)
Supply (X-.)
Demand (XjT) +
Government (X,.)
A variable that needs perhaps some explanation is X,.. The negative sign implies
that as the spread between market levels of mortgage yields and the yield
that FNMA is willing to accept widens, FNMA is providing a subsidizing element
to the market. Hence one would expect the accepted yield in the upcoming
auction to be lower.
In some sense, the informational content in the lagged variables in the
regression model parallels the information available in the naive model. Both
the naive model and the lagged variables incorporate information known at the
most recent auction. The full set of determinants in the expanded model are
more pleasing, however, as they incorporate reasonable institutional lags
(the periodicity of loan committee meetings, new home construction times, etc.)
as well as new information (since the most recent auction).
18
As to the choice of interpolated versus actual data, it is believed
that interpolation (however calculated) of any of the explanatory variables
would be arbitrary, at best; and might produce some unjustified trending in
the series. In addition, tests employing Box-J*enkins techinques were un-
successful, largely because of the complexity involved in forecasting some
of the variables. Furthermore, it is shown in the final model that lag
relationships exist (conforming to real world observations) which
make expectational forecasts are unnecessary.
19
In a subsequent test, the model was analyzed in terms of changes,
rather than levels. Although statistically significant, the predictive
power of the change model was found to be considerably less than the level
form. For the estimation period, the adjusted R2 figures for the FHA/VA and
conventional equations are .5668 and .6123, respectively, and all variables
Forecast Period Results
Table II presents the results using the estimation period parameters and
observations on the pre-determined variables for the second period to
produce a set of predicted accepted low yields. In addition the standard
error of estimates and mean absolute errors for the naive models are
included to demonstrate the superiority of the expanded model in the
forecast (test) period, as well as the estimation period.
As can be seen, the corrleations between the actual and the predicted
are quite high. In addition, the forecasted values for the regression
model are within approximately 6 basis points on average , across the 68
auction forecast period. The last fitted value is over 30 months away from
the initial estimation period and only those inputs which are known by the
HBF prior to each auction are used as determinants in the model.
Model Refinements
One of the benefits of regression analysis is that it allows one to
attach a probability, in the way of a confidence interval, to the fore-
casted value. The MBF can develop a confidence interval about the fore-
casted low yield and thus attach a probability to a certain low bid being
accepted.
Although not obvious, each regression would resemble:
Y = C + B
1
X
1
+ B
2
X
2
+ B
3
X
3
+ B^ + B
5
(X
$
- X
g t ^
+ E
if the previous low bid were used this would not be a fair comparison.
for the expanded model would include the naive model (Y = Y ,), and in such
a case, the expanded model would surely win.
21
Running the regression over the entire period the signs are unchanged.
17
This greatly aids the MBF for two reasons. First of all, as pre-
viously mentioned, the firm faces two time-related risk problems. Coverage
for its portfolio position is important; and therefore, it seeks to have
its bid accpeted by the FNI1A. Still, to remain competitive in the loan
origiantion market place, it seeks to obtain the coverage at the lowest
possible yield.
Since the IIBF can submit up to five bids in each of the two auctions,
the probability parameter enables it to submit some bids with a very high
probability of acceptance (relatively unattractive yield), and some bids
at a very low probability of acceptance (but a corresponding very attractive
yield). Thus, it does not have to submit all bids at the same yield but can
obtain coverage (with a high probability of acceptance) for a given amount
and take a chance on another amount of very profitable coverage.
Seventy-five percent, 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence intervals about each
of the forecasts were generated, based on the assumption of normal distributions.
In every instance, the true value of the low accepted bid fell within the
constructed interval, confirming the reliability fo the model as a forecast-
ing tool, but questioning the normality assumption. With this in mind, pro-
22babilities based upon historical occurrences were created (see Table III).
Although these probabilities do not conform to the assumptions of regression
analysis, they do seem more appropriate for the working world of the MBF. In
other words, the confidence interval multipliers shown in Table III should be used
rather than the normal distribution multipliers (which are much larger). Hence,
22
The historical probabilities listed in Table III were generated by
empirically analyzing the forecasts {65 in all) and determining what set of
multipliers, when adjusted by the forecast error, would produce the indicated
acceptance probability. In other words, in 3A- cases (50%), if the MBF had
taken the low bid predicted by the model and adjusted this bid by (.05) X
(forecast error), the "new" adjusted bid would have been accpeted. Similar
interpretations can be given for higher levels of probability of acceptance.
TABLE III
HISTORICAL CONFIDENCE INTERVAL MULTIPLIERS*
18
Probability of
Acceptance
.95
.90
.85
.80
.75
.70
.65
.60
.55
.50
Historic-Actual Historic-Actual
FNMA FNMA
FHA/VA Conventional
.344 .411
.290 .264
.248 .231
.214 .190
.186 .169
.162 .148
.128 .127
.093 .105
.071 .087
.050 .071
*For correct interpretation of the table, the numbers presented should
be multiplied times the standard error of the forecast, with the resulting
product being added to the forecast. This adjusted forecast has the indicated
probability of acceptance. For example, if the FHA model developed in this
paper forecasts a bid of 10.000%, with a standard error of .084, for the up-
coming auction, the MBF should bid 10.29 to be 95% confident of its bid being
accepted (10.000 + .344 x .084 = 10.02y).
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taking the SEE's shown in Table II as representative of the error in forecast-
ing, the 95% confidence limits for an FHA/VA bid would be the forecast low
accepted bid - .029 (.344 x .084). Similarly, the 95% confidence for a con-
ventional bid would be the forecast low accepted bid - .028 (.411 x .069).
These small basis point ranges demonstrate the usefulness of these models
to the MBF. An examination of the auctions over the past 5 years shows this
spread to compare quite favorably with the typical spread between low and
average accepted bids.
CONCLUSION
This bid model for FNMA FMS auction is reliable, useful and
theoretically appealing. The agrument is not that a method has been devised
to exploit an inefficient market (the efficiency question has been studiously
avoided); rather, that the FNMA FMS auction can be understood through econometric
analysis. Such an analysis produces results which are useful to the MBF in
light of its particular objectives in the auction.
Obviously, this is only one placement device available to the MBF.
Further research is needed to develop strategies for other placement devices.
Ideally, a model is needed which would incroporate all of the alternative
placement devices available to the MBF.
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For example, the average spread between the low and average accepted
bids for the nost recent five year period in the FHA/VA auction was 4.3 basis
points. Since the MBF is interested in the upside (having its bid accepted)
an adjustment of + .029 basis points compares quite favorably with auction
results, especially considering the high probability of acceptance (95%).
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